# ci-actions Shared composite actions for Gitea Actions. ## trivy-gate Scans a pushed image with Trivy (vulnerabilities + secrets) and fails when it finds a **fixable** vulnerability of the given severities (default `HIGH,CRITICAL`) or an embedded secret. Vulnerabilities without a fix are reported but never block - otherwise a deploy could be stuck forever. Intended order in a pipeline: 1. build and push only the immutable tag (`sha-…`) 2. `trivy-gate` on that tag 3. move the floating tag (`latest`, `stable-`) and deploy ```yaml - id: trivy uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v1 with: image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:sha-${{ steps.build.outputs.sha }} username: ${{ gitea.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }} platform: linux/arm64 # single-platform non-amd64 images only mode: block # or warn skip: ${{ inputs.skip_trivy || 'false' }} ``` Source trees (apps that ship no image, e.g. an APK): `scan-type: fs` scans the git-tracked files plus lockfiles generated in the job (also gitignored ones like Flutter's `pubspec.lock`), so run it after the dependency fetch: ```yaml - uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v2 with: scan-type: fs ``` Jobs without a Docker daemon (a `container:` image such as Flutter) fall back to the pinned Trivy release binary, verified by SHA-256 (`runtime: auto`); `jq` is installed with apt when missing. Accepted risks go to `.trivyignore.yaml` in the calling repo, each with a statement and an expiry, so they come back on their own: ```yaml vulnerabilities: - id: CVE-2026-12345 statement: not reachable, the affected feature is disabled expired_at: 2026-12-31 ``` The vulnerability DB lives in the Docker named volume `trivy-cache` on the runner host (refreshed under an exclusive lock, scans read it read-only under a shared lock, so parallel matrix jobs are fine). ## dtrack-sbom Converts the `trivy-gate` report to CycloneDX and uploads it to Dependency-Track. Never fails the job. ```yaml - uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/dtrack-sbom@v1 with: report: ${{ steps.trivy.outputs.report }} url: ${{ vars.DTRACK_URL }} api-key: ${{ secrets.DTRACK_API_KEY }} ca-pem: ${{ vars.RFA_CA_PEM }} project: my-image version: latest ``` ## trivy-gate: misconfigurations `scanners: misconfig` with `scan-type: fs` checks Dockerfiles, compose and other IaC in the tree. These findings are reported (HIGH/CRITICAL by default) and never block. ```yaml - uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v2 with: scan-type: fs scanners: misconfig mode: warn ``` ## gitleaks Scans the commits of the push (`before..sha`, first-parent line, merge diffs off, so merging upstream into a fork does not report upstream history) for secrets, with redacted output. Without a `.gitleaks.toml` in the repo the default rules apply with test files and fixtures allowlisted. The release binary is verified by SHA-256. ```yaml - uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/gitleaks@v2 with: mode: block # or warn ``` ## Versions `v1` image gate + SBOM; `v2` fs scans, binary runtime, misconfig, gitleaks; `v3` gitleaks fetches the parent of a single commit in a depth-1 checkout (dispatch/cron runs scanned the whole tree as a root commit before). ## portainer-deploy Updates a Portainer Swarm stack from a compose file in the repository - the last step of the build → `trivy-gate` → move `latest` → deploy pipeline. The compose file in git is the single source of truth: Portainer's stored compose is replaced on every deploy. The stack's env vars (where the secrets live) are kept and never logged; only `vars` are overwritten. Images are re-pulled (`pullImage`). ```yaml - uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/portainer-deploy@v5 with: url: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_URL }} token: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_TOKEN }} stack-id: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_STACK_ID }} # empty = skip with a notice compose-file: docker-compose.swarm.yml vars: | IMAGE_TAG=sha-${{ steps.build.outputs.sha }} smoke-url: https://app.example.org/health # optional smoke-status: "200" smoke-timeout: "180" ``` Config files from the repo can ride along as Swarm configs. Each becomes a config named after its content hash, created when missing; the stack variable points at it, so a changed file rolls the services that mount it, and superseded versions are removed once nothing uses them: ```yaml configs: | CFG_NGINX=deploy/nginx.conf config-prefix: myapp_ ``` ```yaml # compose configs: nginx_conf: {external: true, name: "${CFG_NGINX}"} ``` Pin images in the compose file to the variable (`image: …:${IMAGE_TAG}`), so the deployed version is the commit that passed the gate, not whatever `latest` points at when Swarm pulls.