Trivy and gitleaks were pinned (version + tarball SHA-256 + image digest) with nothing to bump them. Renovate (tth/renovate) now does; .gitea/update-checksums.sh recomputes the SHA-256s after a bump and checks them against the release checksums file; pr-check.yml runs the PR's actions with the Trivy container and with the pinned binary (checksum verified); tag.yml cuts the next vN after renovate-bot's merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ci-actions
Shared composite actions for Gitea Actions.
trivy-gate
Scans a pushed image with Trivy (vulnerabilities + secrets) and fails when it
finds a fixable vulnerability of the given severities (default
HIGH,CRITICAL) or an embedded secret. Vulnerabilities without a fix are
reported but never block - otherwise a deploy could be stuck forever.
Intended order in a pipeline:
- build and push only the immutable tag (
sha-…) trivy-gateon that tag- move the floating tag (
latest,stable-<arch>) and deploy
- id: trivy
uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v1
with:
image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:sha-${{ steps.build.outputs.sha }}
username: ${{ gitea.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
platform: linux/arm64 # single-platform non-amd64 images only
mode: block # or warn
skip: ${{ inputs.skip_trivy || 'false' }}
Source trees (apps that ship no image, e.g. an APK): scan-type: fs scans
the git-tracked files plus lockfiles generated in the job (also gitignored
ones like Flutter's pubspec.lock), so run it after the dependency fetch:
- uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v2
with:
scan-type: fs
Jobs without a Docker daemon (a container: image such as Flutter) fall
back to the pinned Trivy release binary, verified by SHA-256 (runtime: auto); jq is installed with apt when missing.
Accepted risks go to .trivyignore.yaml in the calling repo, each with a
statement and an expiry, so they come back on their own:
vulnerabilities:
- id: CVE-2026-12345
statement: not reachable, the affected feature is disabled
expired_at: 2026-12-31
The vulnerability DB lives in the Docker named volume trivy-cache on the
runner host (refreshed under an exclusive lock, scans read it read-only under
a shared lock, so parallel matrix jobs are fine).
dtrack-sbom
Converts the trivy-gate report to CycloneDX and uploads it to
Dependency-Track. Never fails the job.
- uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/dtrack-sbom@v1
with:
report: ${{ steps.trivy.outputs.report }}
url: ${{ vars.DTRACK_URL }}
api-key: ${{ secrets.DTRACK_API_KEY }}
ca-pem: ${{ vars.RFA_CA_PEM }}
project: my-image
version: latest
trivy-gate: misconfigurations
scanners: misconfig with scan-type: fs checks Dockerfiles, compose and
other IaC in the tree. These findings are reported (HIGH/CRITICAL by
default) and never block.
- uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/trivy-gate@v2
with:
scan-type: fs
scanners: misconfig
mode: warn
gitleaks
Scans the commits of the push (before..sha, first-parent line, merge diffs
off, so merging upstream into a fork does not report upstream history) for
secrets, with redacted output. Without a .gitleaks.toml in the repo the
default rules apply with test files and fixtures allowlisted. The release
binary is verified by SHA-256.
- uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/gitleaks@v2
with:
mode: block # or warn
Versions
v1 image gate + SBOM; v2 fs scans, binary runtime, misconfig, gitleaks;
v3 gitleaks fetches the parent of a single commit in a depth-1 checkout
(dispatch/cron runs scanned the whole tree as a root commit before).
Pinned tools (Trivy binary + image, gitleaks) are bumped by Renovate
(tth/renovate). Its post-upgrade task .gitea/update-checksums.sh
recomputes the tarball SHA-256 pins (downloaded and checked against the
release's checksums file); .gitea/workflows/pr-check.yml runs the actions
of the PR branch with both Trivy runtimes; after the merge tag.yml cuts
the next vN, which the pipelines then pick up through their own Renovate
PR. Hand-made changes are tagged by hand as before.
portainer-deploy
Updates a Portainer Swarm stack from a compose file in the repository - the
last step of the build → trivy-gate → move latest → deploy pipeline. The
compose file in git is the single source of truth: Portainer's stored
compose is replaced on every deploy. The stack's env vars (where the secrets
live) are kept and never logged; only vars are overwritten. Images are
re-pulled (pullImage).
- uses: https://git.rfa.cz/tth-pub/ci-actions/portainer-deploy@v5
with:
url: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_URL }}
token: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_TOKEN }}
stack-id: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_STACK_ID }} # empty = skip with a notice
compose-file: docker-compose.swarm.yml
vars: |
IMAGE_TAG=sha-${{ steps.build.outputs.sha }}
smoke-url: https://app.example.org/health # optional
smoke-status: "200"
smoke-timeout: "180"
Config files from the repo can ride along as Swarm configs. Each becomes a config named after its content hash, created when missing; the stack variable points at it, so a changed file rolls the services that mount it, and superseded versions are removed once nothing uses them:
configs: |
CFG_NGINX=deploy/nginx.conf
config-prefix: myapp_
# compose
configs:
nginx_conf: {external: true, name: "${CFG_NGINX}"}
Pin images in the compose file to the variable (image: …:${IMAGE_TAG}), so
the deployed version is the commit that passed the gate, not whatever
latest points at when Swarm pulls.