harden: bounds-check radio TRACE/PATH packet parsing
onRecvPacket() used two received length fields without validating them against the actual received/decrypted length (TRACE payload_len underflow + OOB read; PATH path_len OOB stack read + extra_len underflow). Both now validated before use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7b56667054
commit
ab2eb70714
1 file changed
+20
-9
+20
-9
@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ int Mesh::searchChannelsByHash(const uint8_t* hash, GroupChannel channels[], int
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DispatcherAction Mesh::onRecvPacket(Packet* pkt) {
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if (pkt->isRouteDirect() && pkt->getPayloadType() == PAYLOAD_TYPE_TRACE) {
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if (pkt->path_len < MAX_PATH_SIZE) {
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// TRACE header is trace_tag(4)+auth_code(4)+flags(1) = 9 bytes. Without this
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// guard a crafted short TRACE (payload_len < 9) underflows `len` below to a
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// large value and steers the isHashMatch() read past the payload buffer.
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if (pkt->payload_len < 9) return ACTION_RELEASE;
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uint8_t i = 0;
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uint32_t trace_tag;
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memcpy(&trace_tag, &pkt->payload[i], 4); i += 4;
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@@ -55,7 +59,8 @@ DispatcherAction Mesh::onRecvPacket(Packet* pkt) {
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uint16_t offset = (uint16_t)pkt->path_len << path_sz;
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if (offset >= len) { // TRACE has reached end of given path
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onTraceRecv(pkt, trace_tag, auth_code, flags, pkt->path, &pkt->payload[i], len);
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} else if (self_id.isHashMatch(&pkt->payload[i + offset], 1 << path_sz) && allowPacketForward(pkt) && !_tables->hasSeen(pkt)) {
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} else if ((size_t)i + offset + (1u << path_sz) <= pkt->payload_len
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&& self_id.isHashMatch(&pkt->payload[i + offset], 1 << path_sz) && allowPacketForward(pkt) && !_tables->hasSeen(pkt)) {
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// append SNR (Not hash!)
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pkt->path[pkt->path_len++] = (int8_t) (pkt->getSNR()*4);
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@@ -158,14 +163,20 @@ DispatcherAction Mesh::onRecvPacket(Packet* pkt) {
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uint8_t hash_size = (path_len >> 6) + 1;
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uint8_t hash_count = path_len & 63;
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uint8_t* path = &data[k]; k += hash_size*hash_count;
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uint8_t extra_type = data[k++] & 0x0F; // upper 4 bits reserved for future use
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uint8_t* extra = &data[k];
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uint8_t extra_len = len - k; // remainder of packet (may be padded with zeroes!)
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if (onPeerPathRecv(pkt, j, secret, path, path_len, extra_type, extra, extra_len)) {
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if (pkt->isRouteFlood()) {
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// send a reciprocal return path to sender, but send DIRECTLY!
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mesh::Packet* rpath = createPathReturn(&src_hash, secret, pkt->path, pkt->path_len, 0, NULL, 0);
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if (rpath) sendDirect(rpath, path, path_len, 500);
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// path_len comes from the (decrypted) payload and is otherwise unchecked:
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// without this guard `k` can jump past the `data` buffer (data[k] OOB read)
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// and `extra_len = len - k` underflows. Require a valid path length and that
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// the path + trailing extra_type byte fit within the decrypted length.
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if (Packet::isValidPathLen(path_len) && k < len) {
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uint8_t extra_type = data[k++] & 0x0F; // upper 4 bits reserved for future use
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uint8_t* extra = &data[k];
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uint8_t extra_len = len - k; // remainder of packet (may be padded with zeroes!)
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if (onPeerPathRecv(pkt, j, secret, path, path_len, extra_type, extra, extra_len)) {
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if (pkt->isRouteFlood()) {
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// send a reciprocal return path to sender, but send DIRECTLY!
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mesh::Packet* rpath = createPathReturn(&src_hash, secret, pkt->path, pkt->path_len, 0, NULL, 0);
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if (rpath) sendDirect(rpath, path, path_len, 500);
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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