Repeater, room server, sensor: passwords can no longer be guessed over the air at full speed, and a replayed login no longer floods a reply

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tthandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-18 13:03:59 +01:00
1 parent de92ca9ba2
commit dbdae14566
8 files changed
+123

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+10
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@@ -359,10 +359,19 @@ uint8_t MyMesh::handleLoginReq(const mesh::Identity& sender, const uint8_t* secr
#if MESH_DEBUG
MESH_DEBUG_PRINTLN("Login, sender not in ACL");
#endif
} else {
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): a blank login has a replay floor too -- replayed, it
// gained nothing, but each copy made us flood a reply over the mesh.
if (sender_timestamp <= client->last_timestamp) return 0;
acl.persistTimestamp(client, sender_timestamp, getRTCClock()->getCurrentTime());
client->last_timestamp = sender_timestamp;
}
}
if (client == NULL) {
uint8_t perms;
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): capped wrong passwords (LoginGuard.h); a known admin is never locked out
ClientInfo* known = acl.getClient(sender.pub_key, PUB_KEY_SIZE);
if (login_guard.locked(millis()) && !(known && known->isAdmin())) return 0;
if (strcmp((char *)data, _prefs.password) == 0) { // check for valid admin password
perms = PERM_ACL_ADMIN;
} else if (strcmp((char *)data, _prefs.guest_password) == 0) { // check guest password
@@ -371,6 +380,7 @@ uint8_t MyMesh::handleLoginReq(const mesh::Identity& sender, const uint8_t* secr
#if MESH_DEBUG
MESH_DEBUG_PRINTLN("Invalid password: %s", data);
#endif
login_guard.failed(millis()); // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
return 0;
}
+2
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <helpers/AdvertDataHelpers.h>
#include <helpers/ArduinoHelpers.h>
#include <helpers/ClientACL.h>
#include <helpers/LoginGuard.h> // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
#include <helpers/CommonCLI.h>
#include <helpers/IdentityStore.h>
#include <helpers/SimpleMeshTables.h>
@@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ class MyMesh : public mesh::Mesh, public CommonCLICallbacks {
bool _logging;
NodePrefs _prefs;
ClientACL acl;
LoginGuard login_guard; // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
CommonCLI _cli;
uint8_t reply_data[MAX_PACKET_PAYLOAD];
uint8_t reply_path[MAX_PATH_SIZE];
+10
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@@ -350,10 +350,19 @@ void MyMesh::onAnonDataRecv(mesh::Packet *packet, const uint8_t *secret, const m
#if MESH_DEBUG
MESH_DEBUG_PRINTLN("Login, sender not in ACL");
#endif
} else {
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): a blank login has a replay floor too -- replayed, it
// gained nothing, but each copy made us flood a reply over the mesh.
if (sender_timestamp <= client->last_timestamp) return;
acl.persistTimestamp(client, sender_timestamp, getRTCClock()->getCurrentTime());
client->last_timestamp = sender_timestamp;
}
}
if (client == NULL) {
uint8_t perm;
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): capped wrong passwords (LoginGuard.h); a known admin is never locked out
ClientInfo* known = acl.getClient(sender.pub_key, PUB_KEY_SIZE);
if (login_guard.locked(millis()) && !(known && known->isAdmin())) return;
if (strcmp((char *)&data[8], _prefs.password) == 0) { // check for valid admin password
perm = PERM_ACL_ADMIN;
} else {
@@ -363,6 +372,7 @@ void MyMesh::onAnonDataRecv(mesh::Packet *packet, const uint8_t *secret, const m
perm = PERM_ACL_GUEST;
} else {
MESH_DEBUG_PRINTLN("Incorrect room password");
login_guard.failed(millis()); // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
return; // no response. Client will timeout
}
}
+2
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <helpers/CommonCLI.h>
#include <helpers/StatsFormatHelper.h>
#include <helpers/ClientACL.h>
#include <helpers/LoginGuard.h> // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
#include <helpers/RegionMap.h>
#include <helpers/RoutingPolicy.h>
#include <RTClib.h>
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ class MyMesh : public mesh::Mesh, public CommonCLICallbacks {
TransportKeyStore key_store;
RegionMap region_map, temp_map;
ClientACL acl;
LoginGuard login_guard; // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
CommonCLI _cli;
unsigned long dirty_contacts_expiry;
uint8_t reply_data[MAX_PACKET_PAYLOAD];
+9
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@@ -374,11 +374,20 @@ uint8_t SensorMesh::handleLoginReq(const mesh::Identity& sender, const uint8_t*
#endif
return 0;
}
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): a blank login has a replay floor too -- replayed, it
// gained nothing, but each copy made us send a reply.
if (sender_timestamp <= client->last_timestamp) return 0;
acl.persistTimestamp(client, sender_timestamp, getRTCClock()->getCurrentTime());
client->last_timestamp = sender_timestamp;
} else {
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): capped wrong passwords (LoginGuard.h); a known admin is never locked out
ClientInfo* known = acl.getClient(sender.pub_key, PUB_KEY_SIZE);
if (login_guard.locked(millis()) && !(known && known->isAdmin())) return 0;
if (strcmp((char *) data, _prefs.password) != 0) { // check for valid admin password
#if MESH_DEBUG
MESH_DEBUG_PRINTLN("Invalid password: %s", &data[0]);
#endif
login_guard.failed(millis()); // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
return 0;
}
+2
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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <helpers/CommonCLI.h>
#include <helpers/StatsFormatHelper.h>
#include <helpers/ClientACL.h>
#include <helpers/LoginGuard.h> // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
#include <helpers/RegionMap.h>
#include <RTClib.h>
#include <target.h>
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ private:
unsigned long next_local_advert, next_flood_advert;
NodePrefs _prefs;
ClientACL acl;
LoginGuard login_guard; // CUSTOM (TeTeHacko)
CommonCLI _cli;
uint8_t reply_data[MAX_PACKET_PAYLOAD];
unsigned long dirty_contacts_expiry;
+41
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
#pragma once
#include <stdint.h>
// CUSTOM (TeTeHacko): a cap on wrong passwords. Upstream checks every login,
// so a password can be guessed over the air as fast as the channel carries
// packets, from a fresh identity each time, and a wrong one is not even
// answered. After LOGIN_FAIL_MAX wrong passwords within LOGIN_FAIL_SECS no
// password is checked until that window ends.
//
// The caller lets a client that is already an admin in the ACL through anyway:
// a login is encrypted with the sender's key, so nobody can send one in an
// admin's name, and a guessing attack cannot lock the admins out.
//
// Times are millis(), compared by difference: a clock set backwards or the
// 49-day wrap cannot stretch the window.
#ifndef LOGIN_FAIL_MAX
#define LOGIN_FAIL_MAX 4
#endif
#ifndef LOGIN_FAIL_SECS
#define LOGIN_FAIL_SECS 180
#endif
class LoginGuard {
uint32_t _since = 0; // millis() of the first failure in the window
uint16_t _fails = 0;
bool inWindow(uint32_t now_ms) const { return now_ms - _since < LOGIN_FAIL_SECS * 1000UL; }
public:
bool locked(uint32_t now_ms) const { return _fails >= LOGIN_FAIL_MAX && inWindow(now_ms); }
void failed(uint32_t now_ms) {
if (_fails == 0 || !inWindow(now_ms)) {
_since = now_ms;
_fails = 0;
}
if (_fails < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX) _fails++;
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include "helpers/LoginGuard.h"
static const uint32_t WINDOW_MS = LOGIN_FAIL_SECS * 1000UL;
TEST(LoginGuard, LocksAfterTheCap) {
LoginGuard g;
for (int i = 0; i < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX; i++) {
EXPECT_FALSE(g.locked(1000 + i));
g.failed(1000 + i);
}
EXPECT_TRUE(g.locked(1000 + LOGIN_FAIL_MAX));
}
TEST(LoginGuard, UnlocksWhenTheWindowEnds) {
LoginGuard g;
for (int i = 0; i < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX; i++) g.failed(1000);
EXPECT_TRUE(g.locked(1000 + WINDOW_MS - 1));
EXPECT_FALSE(g.locked(1000 + WINDOW_MS));
}
TEST(LoginGuard, FailuresInAnOldWindowDoNotCount) {
LoginGuard g;
for (int i = 0; i < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX - 1; i++) g.failed(1000);
g.failed(1000 + WINDOW_MS); // a new window: one failure, not LOGIN_FAIL_MAX
EXPECT_FALSE(g.locked(1000 + WINDOW_MS + 1));
}
TEST(LoginGuard, LockedFailuresDoNotExtendTheWindow) {
LoginGuard g;
for (int i = 0; i < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX; i++) g.failed(1000);
for (uint32_t t = 1000; t < 1000 + WINDOW_MS; t += 1000) g.failed(t); // the caller does not, but still
EXPECT_FALSE(g.locked(1000 + WINDOW_MS));
}
TEST(LoginGuard, SurvivesTheMillisWrap) {
LoginGuard g;
const uint32_t start = 0xFFFFFFFFu - 1000;
for (int i = 0; i < LOGIN_FAIL_MAX; i++) g.failed(start);
EXPECT_TRUE(g.locked(start + 2000)); // wrapped past 0
EXPECT_FALSE(g.locked(start + WINDOW_MS));
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}