README, docs: replay floor for admins only (de92ca9b), capped wrong passwords and the blank-login floor (dbdae145) -- LOGIN_FAIL_MAX/SECS, upstream candidates
pub-release / release (push) Successful in 38m32s

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tthandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-18 13:04:29 +01:00
1 parent dbdae14566
commit 961547c7d2
2 files changed
+24 -2

No files matched your search

+23 -2
View File
@@ -114,7 +114,17 @@ Repeater navíc:
než příkaz provedou (`/s_acl_ts0|1`, střídavě s kontrolním součtem, takže
ho nesmaže ani výpadek napájení při zápisu). Timestamp víc než den před
hodinami uzlu (`ACL_TS_MAX_AHEAD`) se přijme, ale neuloží, aby companion
s rozhozenými hodinami nezamkl admina. Klientů se to nijak netýká.
s rozhozenými hodinami nezamkl admina. Ukládá se jen u adminů: host smí
jen číst a s prázdným guest heslem se jím stane kdokoli, takže by každý
jeho dotaz znamenal zápis do flash. Klientů se to nijak netýká.
* **Hesla nejde hádat přes éter plnou rychlostí.** Upstream kontroluje každý
login bez omezení a na špatné heslo ani neodpoví. Po 4 špatných heslech
během 3 minut (`LOGIN_FAIL_MAX`, `LOGIN_FAIL_SECS`) se hesla do konce okna
nekontrolují. Klient, který už je v ACL jako admin, projde vždy – login
jeho jménem nikdo jiný poslat nedokáže, takže útok adminy nezamkne.
* **Přehraný login bez hesla už nevyvolá flood odpověď.** Login klienta z ACL
s prázdným heslem neměl ochranu proti přehrání; útočník tím nic nezískal,
ale každá kopie donutila uzel poslat odpověď floodem přes celý mesh.
* TRACE už nepřipisuje cestu za konec payloadu; parsování TRACE/PATH
a `Packet::readFrom` hlídají meze.
* `markSeen` je zase idempotentní (odesílací cesta ujídala okno deduplikace).
@@ -410,7 +420,18 @@ The repeater also has:
command (`/s_acl_ts0|1`, alternating with a checksum, so a power cut mid-write
does not lose it). A timestamp more than a day ahead of the node's clock
(`ACL_TS_MAX_AHEAD`) is accepted but not stored, so a companion with a runaway
clock cannot lock its admin out. Nothing changes for clients.
clock cannot lock its admin out. Only admins are stored: a guest can only
read, and with the empty guest password anybody is one, so its every
request would be a flash write. Nothing changes for clients.
* **Passwords can no longer be guessed over the air at full speed.** Upstream
checks every login without a limit and does not even answer a wrong one.
After 4 wrong passwords within 3 minutes (`LOGIN_FAIL_MAX`,
`LOGIN_FAIL_SECS`) no password is checked until the window ends. A client
that is already an admin in the ACL always gets through -- nobody else can
send a login in its name, so the attack cannot lock the admins out.
* **A replayed blank-password login no longer floods a reply.** A login from a
client in the ACL with an empty password had no replay check; replayed, it
gained nothing, but every copy made the node flood its reply over the mesh.
* TRACE no longer appends its path past the end of the payload; TRACE/PATH
parsing and `Packet::readFrom` are bounds-checked.
* `markSeen` is idempotent again (the send path was eating the dedup window).
+1
View File
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ The ones that change what a node does; set in `platformio.ini` /
| `FW_OTA` | `-ota` images | admin-pushed firmware update |
| `PATH_HASH_MODE_DEFAULT` | `1` (2 B per hop) | path hash width for a node without prefs |
| `ACL_TS_MAX_AHEAD` | `86400` (s) | a client timestamp further ahead of the node's clock is not stored as the replay floor |
| `LOGIN_FAIL_MAX`, `LOGIN_FAIL_SECS` | `4`, `180` (s) | after that many wrong passwords in the window no password is checked until it ends (an admin already in the ACL always gets in) |
Prefs saved on the node override the build defaults: a reflash keeps what a
node already has; only a new node or one after `erase` takes them.